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SOME MATTERS OF PRACTICE'
The doctrine of Caveat Emptor applies to judicial sales
of land with even greater force than to sales of land which
are the culmination of negotiations between vendor and
purchaser. A judicial sale can convey only such interest
as the debtor may have in the land and the purchaser must
satisfy himself as to what that interest is. Wells v. Van
Dyke, 106 Pa. 111.
The policy of the law, however, is to encourage bidding
at sheriff's sales by protecting purchasers from certain ir-
regularities in the process leading up to the sale. The Act
of 1705, 1 Sm. L. 61, and numerous later acts were passed
to protect purchasers at execution sales of land against ev-
ery defect or irregularity except when judgment is void on
its face or when there is entire absence of anything in the
sheriff to make a sale. Shannon v. Newton, 132 Pa.
375. The Courts likewise have laid down the general rule
that irregularities in the process leading up to the sale are
cured by the confirmation of the sale and that objection
must be made thereto before such confirmation, that is, by
the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed, formerly in open
court and now, by the Act of April 23, 1905, P. L. 265, be-
fore the prothonotary or deputy prothonotary, but not ear-
iHavIng followed carefully the suggestions of Mr. Sellers in
"Some matters of Practice," Vol. XIX., Dickinson Law Review,
page 233, the "young and inexperienced lawyer" finds more pitfalls
in the path as he proceeds after execution to sale of the defendant's
property.
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Her than the return day of the writ under which the sale
was made.
DEFECTS NOT CURED BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF DEED
The purchaser is bound by everything appearing on the
face of the record and is therefore not protected in pur-
chasing property under a judgment which is void on its
face. (Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 79-Judgment of
married woman prior to 1887). The purchaser's title is
subject to attack at any time on ground of fraud by the pur-
chaser (Evans v. Maury, 112 Pa. 300) but a bona fide
purchaser from the fraudulent purchaser acquires a valid
title.
The acknowledgment of the deed before the return day
(Glancey v. Jones, 4 Yeates 212) or a sale on a lian which
had been previously discharged (Leeds v.Artzt, 2 W. N.
C. 507) can be set up after confirmation of the sale to
avoid the sale.
DEFECTS CURED BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Although a sale on a judgment, which is void because
of defendant being a married woman, is void and not affect-
ed by acknowledgment (Wells v. Van Dyke, 106 Pa. 111),
the confirmation of the sheriff's sale by acknowledgment in
open court is complete protection to the purchaser when de-
fendant in judgment was declared a lunatic as of date prior
to entry of judgment against him. Shannon v. Newton,
132 Pa. 375. This apparent contradiction is explained by
the fact that the defect in the first case appears on the rec-
ord while in the latter case there is nothing on the record
to warn the purchaser.
The sale of corporate property of a public service cor-
poration under a common fi. fa., instead of a special fi. fa.
under the Act of 1870, (P. L. 58), is only irregular and
must be complained of before confirmation. Lusk's Ap-
peal, 108 Pa. 152. But where the interest of a life ten-
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ant is sold under a fi. fa., instead of under a vend. ex. with
notice and leave of court, the sale is not merely irregular
but void and the purchaser acquires no title. Henry v.
McClellan, 146 Pa. 34.
The issuance of execution before entry of judgment is
an irregularity cured by acknowledgment of the deed
(Clough v. Welsh, 229 Pa. 386); likewise a failure to hold
an inquisition or to condemn the land prior to sale
(Clough v. Welsh, 229 Pa. 386); or the failure to deliver a
testatum fi. fa. to the prothonotary of the county to which
the same is issued and record it in his office under Act of
16 June, 1836 P. L. 775. Mencke v. Rosenberg, 202 Pa.
131.
If the purchaser refuses to pay the purchase price the
sheriff may refuse to return the sale and acknowledge the
deed; but if he acknowledge the deed the title passes to the
purchaser who becomes indebted for purchase price and at
most the sheriff has an equitable lien on a property by
holding the deed.
RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO RELY ON RECORD
The purchaser is bound to examine the grantor and
mortgagor indices in the office of the recorder of deeds as
to every owner of whom he has record or actual notice;
but he is not required to examine grantee and mortgagee
indices. Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. 164. The duty to see
that the instrument under which he claims is properly re-
corded is on the grantee or mortgagee and defective index-
ing or recording is fatal to the conveyance or mortgage as
against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees. Prouty v.
Marshall, 225 Pa. 570.
The fact that a lien has been paid does not affect a pur-
chaser if the record does not show satisfaction. Thus
where the record showed a judgment as the first lien fol-
lowed by a mortgage, the judgment having in fact been
paid, the purchaser at the sale on execution on a subsequent
judgment acquired the land discharged of the mortgage.
Saunders v. Bould, 134 Pa. 445. The purchaser is not
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affected by notice of a proceeding to open judgment pending
at the time of sale. Meigs v. Bunting, 141 Pa. 233.
Likewise a judgment marked satisfied, but actually unpaid,
is to be treated as satisfied by the purchaser even though a
rule to strike off satisfaction be pending. Coyne v.
Souther, 61 Pa. 455.
JUDGMENT AND MORTGAGE INDICES
The purchaser's knowledge of the record must depend
upon his examination of the indices of judgments and
mortgages. As to mortgages he must take notice of the
surname and family name of the debtor and examine any
mortgage in which these names appear, disregarding the
middle initial or letter. Land descended to Herman Ber-
gold from his father. As Herman A. Bergold, he executed
a mortgage to Hickey. Two years later as Herman Ber-
gold, not using the middle initial, he sold to Flick on scire
facias. On the mortgage Flick defended on the ground
that he had no notice of the mortgage. The purchaser, the
court held, was bound to take notice of the mortgage of
Herman A. Bergold. Crippen v. Bergold, 258 Pa. 469.
In the case of a difference between the first name or
initial of the mortgagor as it appears in the mortgage and
as it appears in the deed to him, a purchaser of the prem-
ises is not affected with notice of the mortgage (Prouty v.
Marshall, 225 Pa. 570) and purchases the same discharged
of the mortgage.
The rule as to the judgment indices, however, is dif-
ferent. Harry L. Halpern was owner of real estate sub-
ject to the following liens: (1), Judgment entered against
Harry Halpern; (2), mortgage against Harry L. Halpern;
(3), judgment against Harry L. Halpern. On execution
on No. 3, the property was sold. Later a scire facias was
issued on the mortgage (No. 2) and the terre tenant de-
fended on the ground that judgment No. 1, having been
discharged by the former sale, the mortgage following the
first judgment was also discharged. It was held, however,
that a judgment entered against Harry Halpern was not
DICKTNSON LAW REviEw
notice of a lien against Harry L. Halpern. The mortgagee
(No. 2) had no notice of the judgment (No. 1), he being
bound to examine the records only as to the name of the
owner as set forth in the deed of conveyance to him. The
purchaser at the execution sale is bound by the record and
not by notice of facts outside the record. As to the mort-
gagee the first judgment was not a lien and therefore the
mortgage was not discharged.
The purchaser erred in relying upon knowledge or as-
sumption that Harry Halpern and Harry L. Halpern were
the same person and purchased the land subject to the
mortgage which he naturally believed to have been dis-
charged by the sale. Pennsylvania Co. v. Halpern, 273
Pa. 451.
The purchaser at a judicial sale takes subject to the
right of a tenant whose lease was prior to the date of re-
cording of the mortgage Upon foreclosure of which sale was
made. But if th mortgage is prior to the lease the fact
that the foreclosure is made merely in order to defeat the
lease does not avail the tenant. Roush v. Herbick, 269
Pa. 145.
If the judgment is reversed after the sale of the defend-
ants land he is entitled to a writ of restitution as to the
purchase price of the land only. Even if the judgment
plaintiff is the purchaser the restitution is of the purchase




Sales-Executory Sales-Damages--Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Strong contracted to deliver 100 baskets of peaches at $1.50 a
bsket. He failed to deliver them or any part of them. Hopper
alleges this failure and proves that peaches of this quality were at
the time of delivery selling for $2.00 per basket. He sues In as-
sumpsit for $.50 x 100. He did not show that he bought other
peaches and paid $2.00 per basket. The court entered a non-suit
which it refused to take off.
Kline, for the Plaintiff.
Kreider, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KEENER, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from order of
Common Pleas Coure, refusing to take off non-suit.
There are two questions to be decided In this case. 1st. What
is the measure of damages for the seller's failure to deliver? 2nd.
After having proved the market price at time and place of delivery
must buyer also show that he went Into the market and purchased
In order that he may recover his damages?
After reviewing the Pa. reports and statutes we find the law
concerning the first question to be as provided In Clause 3, Sec.
7, of the Sales Act of 1915. (P. L. 543). "Where there is an
available market for the goods In question, the measure of dam-
ages, In the absence of special circumstances showing proximate
damages of a greater amount, is the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price of the goods at the time or times
when they ought to have been delivered, or, If no time was fixed,
then at time of refusal to deliver."
This section of The Sales Act of 1915 Is construed and sup-
ported In the two recent cases. Seward v. Pa. Salt Mfg. Co.,
266 Pa. 457, and Iron Trade Products Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa.
172.
Sedwick on Damages, Vol. 2, Sec. 734, states this as being the
general rule both In England and United States, citing among his
American authorities numerous Penna. cases so holding. This Is
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also stated by Williston as being the rule. Sec. 599, Willistorr on
Sales.
Circuit Judge Baker in the case of B. & 0., C. T. I. Co. v.
Becker Milling Co., 272 Fed. Rep'r. 936, held, "That the buyer is
entitled to compensation for such breach. The loss is measured
by the distance between the contract price at one end and the mar-
ket price as evidence of the market value at the other."
The rule as laid down in Hauptman v. Pa. W. Home for
Blind Men, 258 Pa. 427, is the following: "Upon a breach of con-
tract by vendor in failing to furnish his vendee goods contracted
for, the latter is entitled to recover compensation for his loss, and
that loss Is measured by the difference in the market value of the
goods the vendor had contracted to furnish and the contract price
which he had agreed to accept. The law is not concerned to in-
quire whether the vendee supplied from other sources the goods
the vendor agreed to furnish nor does it concern the vendor. This
was also held to be the law in the recent case, supra, 272 Pa. 172.
These cases very ably answer the second question.
The learned counsel for the defendant by an ingenious argu-
ment aims to attack the reasonableness of the rule. This argu-
ment we cannot support. *We think the party at fault cannot be
heard to complain of the remedy afforded, which is as reasonable
and just as it is In the case at bar. There may be cases where the
rule might prove inadequate and unfair but this is not so in the
present case. The case cited by the counsel for the defendant,
Morris v. Supplee, 208 Pa. 253, differs substantially from the pres-
ent case, in that it appeared that the plaintiff had supplied himself
with the goods elsewhere at less cost.
In view of the authorities above stated to support the law on
these points, and the fairness with which It applies to the case at
bar, we find that the learned court below erred in refusing to re-
move the non-suit and judgment must be entered .for the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The sales act of 1915, 6 Purd. Dig. p. 7483, provides that the
buyer may recover damages, for failure of the seller to deliver
the goods, and designates the measure of damages, the difference
between the price agreed upon and the higher price current in the
market at the time when the goods should have been delivered.
It says nothing of the purchase of similar goods by the vendee, to
take the place of the goods purchased which the vendor has re-
fused to deliver.
The vendee may have various reasons for not having bought
similar goods, Into which It would be Irrelevant to make inquiry.
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So says Justice Stewart, "The law is not concerned to inquire
whether the vendee supplied from other sources, the goods the
vendor had agreed to furnish, nor does it concern the vendor."
Hauptman v. Home for Blind Men, 258 Pa. 427.
This is the conclusion of the learned court below which must
be affirmed.
STODDARD v. SPENCER
Trespass-Malicious Prosecution-Evidence-Burden of Proof-
Advise of Counsel-Nolle Pros--Probable Cause
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Spencer, employer of Stoddard, believed that the latter had
stolen money from him, and prosecuted him for larceny,
Before doing so, he stated facts, which induced him to sus-
pect guilt, to the District Attorney, who advised him that he ought
to prosecute. There were other facts which weakened the force
of those facts, but these were not disclosed to the attorney. After
the Indictment was brought, a nolle pros was entered.
The court in this action for trespass for malicious prosecution,
said that the entering of a nolle pros. was an indication of want
of probable cause, and that the omission to state some of the facts
which lessened the probative value of the facts stated, prevented
the advise of counsel from making negative the malice. Verdict
for plaintiff.
Wertacnik, for the Plaintiff.
Gelber, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ZIEGLER, J. We must first consider what elements are nec-
essary to justify an action for trespass for malicious prosecution.
In Pennsylvania the defendant must have falsely, maliciously, and
without probable cause charged the plaintiff with the commission
of a crime. Secondly, a warrant must have thereupon been Is-
sued; and thirdly, the plalneiff must have been taken into custody.
Barry v. Pennsylvania Salt Co., 8 W. N. C. 309. That the two
latter elements were present is admitted. Therefore, In order for
the plaintiff to be successful in this suit, the presence of the first
element must be proved.
In making out his cause of claim, the plaintiff points out that
the termination of a criminal prosecution by the entry of a nolle
pros. is prima facie evidence of lack of probable cause. The law
in Pennsylvania Is well settled on this point. The court in Mur-
phy v. Moore, 9 Sadler 64, states absolutely and unequivocally that
the entry of a nolle pros. without the knowledge and consent of
the plaintiff In the action of malicious prosecution is a sufficient
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ending of the prosecution to entitle the plaintiff to mainfain the
action. This is reiterated in Swartz v. Bortree, 253 Pa. 310.
At this point the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that he had probable cause. This is brought out in a case
so recent as Davis v. Wilhelm and Bonnett, 76 Sup. 396. There
It is held that the mere offering of the record of discharge by a
magistrate is sufficient to shift the burden of proof upon the de-
fendant to show that he had probable cause. The nolle pros. In
the casb at bar Is akin to the discharge in a magistrate's office.
The defendant now cites Laughlin v. Clawson, 27 Pa. 328, as
authority for the proposition that an action for malicious prosecu-
tion cannot be sustained, if an officer of the state, appointed be-
cause of his legal learning, considers that a given state of facts
is sufficient evidence of probable cause. This case, however, also
holds that these statements must be proved to be the true facts.
This brings us to the failure of the defendant to disclose some of
the facts. It is admitted that the defendant failed to disclose facts,
which, had the District Attorney known them, would have caused
him to give contrary advise. Thus the conclusion is reached that
the proposition stated by the court In Laughlin v. Clawson, supra,
does not constitute a defense.
Failing here, the defendant turns to foreign jurisdiction to
show that the just rule is that the dismissal of prosecution by a
prosecuting attorney without a hearing before justice does not
make out a prima facie case of want of probable cause. The
courts of the same Jurisdiction, however, hold that evidence of the
fact that an attorney upon a full and fair representation of facts
advised the prosecution does not establish the existence of probable
cause. These decisions, therefore, tend to leave one confused up-
on the subject of probable cause, as there is no decision one way or
another. The active concealment, then, on the part of the defend-
ant, of important facts which weakened 'his ease, throw the bal-
ance against the defendant.
The defendant has failed to show probable cause. Going
further, the law in Pennsylvania is that malice may be inferred
from want of probable cause. Miller v. Hammer, 141 Pa. 196;
Herr v. Lollar, 268 Pa. 109. The entering of the nolle pros. would
lead one to believe that the chances of pursuing the prosecution
to a successful conclusion were rather vague In the mind of the
defendant. Why, then was the prosecution started? The trend
of Pennsylvania decisions seems to infer malice.
That the defendant did not disclose material facts which he
knew would have an important bearing on the case is falsity in
itself. Therefore, the plaintiff has made out all the elements of
malicious prosecution, and despite the able argument of the coun-
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sel for defense, the decision of the learned court below is affrmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The prosecution was ended by the entry of a nolle prosequi.
This is not decisive, however, that there was no probable cause,
apparent at the institution of the prosecution. Facts later discov-
ered, may have changed the purpose of the District Attorney and
of the prosecutor.
Apparently, the facts, if fully revealed to the District Attorney,
would have dissuaded him from abetting the prosecution. But, he
recommended it. His opinion that a larceny had been committed,
was produced by a statement of facts made to him by Spencer
which was, if not untrue, Incomplete, and the omitted facts re-
quired, when known, a different interpretation of the revealed facts.
advice of counsel, after a full disclosure of facts, is a complete
defence for the prosecutor, but there must be a complete and ac-
curate statement of all the facts known to him at the time. 11
Pa. L. Dig. Col. 19415. Jaggard on Torts, Vol. 1, p. 621.
Swartz v. Bortree, 253 Pa. 304.
The verdict virtually finds that the plaintiff was innocent of
the crime with which he was charged, and that the facts known
to the defendant were not such as to repel the hypothesis that he
was acting precipitately, too eagerly, maliciously, In beginning the
prosecution.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.
KING v. SOLWAY
Nuisance-Public Nuisance - Dynamite - Negligence-Damages-
Measure Thereof
STATEMENT OF FACTS
King, owning an office building, let a room in it to Solway for
an office. Without King's consent, Solway put 50 pounds of dyna-
mite in the room. There was also a stove in the room with fire
in it. An explosion occurred which destroyed the building. King
alleges (a) that putting the dynamite in the room was creating a
nuisance, for the result of which Solway was liable, negligent or
not; (b) In that the act was in itself negligent; (c) that the difference
between the value of the premises before and after the explosion
was the measure of damages. A witness was allowed to express
an opinion of the value of the premises before the explosion, but
on cross-examination said that his opinion was derived from the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 253
evidence of the rentals for the last three years before the accident.
A motion to strike out this evidence was refused.
Verdict for plaintiff for $3000.00.
Goodman, for the Plaintiff.
Gans, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
INGHAM, J. The first question to be considered in the case
presented by the argument, is whether or not the defendant, Sol-
way, by placing the dynamite in the room In the manner set forth,
created a nuisance. If so, he is liable for all the consequences nat-
urally flowing from his act, irrespective of the question of negli-
gence upon his part thereafter.
A study of the cases in this State on the subject, from the
time of Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, down to date, leads one to the
conclusion that the mere possession or storage of high explosives
is not in and of itself a public nuisance, even though it may sub-
ject property or person to a risk of injury, because the use of ex-
plosives is so essential to the proper development of our industries;
and the risk to those who come Into contact with it, is necessarily
incident to the prosperity of our large industries. It appears that
the beneficial purpose for which the explosives are intended may
justify its possession on the ground of economic necessity.
It clearly appears, however, that the possession of explosives
may become a public nuisance in either of two ways: When such
possession or storage falls within the express prohibition of a stat-
ute; or when, by force of the surrounding circumstances, such as
the density of population, the manner of storage, the nature and
quantity of the explosive, etc., one can reasonably conclude that the
situation of peril and likelihood of injury to the person or property
of others, created by such storage, was incommensurate with the
legal right of the defendant to have and keep such explosives.
With the exception of the Act of March 20, 1855, the provisions
of which are confined to the city of Philadelphia, there is no stat-
ute in this State which would prohibit the keeping or storing of ex-
plosives as was done in this case. If, therefore, we are to find that
a nuisance was created, It must be from the circumstances sur-
rounding the act of the defendant.
When dynamite is stored under circumstances which have been
found to amount to a public nuisance, the necessity for establishing
negligence in the act Immediately causing the explosion is dispens-
ed with. It has been stated that: "It Is sufficient to prove facts
which justify the finding of a public nuisance, and when the ex-
plosion Is a thing that could naturally flow therefrom, then, since
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that possibility is one of the very elements that go to make up the
nuisance, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the explosion
will be assumed to have followed as a result thereof." Forster v.
Rogers Brothers, 247 Pa. 54.
While the proposition above stated is true, yet it does not fol-
low that negligence Is never considered when the basis of the re-
covery is the existence of a condition amounting to a nuisance.
Negligence may be, and often is, a material factor in the creation
of a condition, the establishment of which determines the existence
of a nuisance. In other words, a person may violate a legal duty
to use care in his conduct by bringing dynamite into a building oc-
cupied by others, and in so doing create a nuisance by his neg-
ligence. He will then be liable for Injury occasioned by a purely
accidental explosion of the dynamite, without regard to the fact
that he may have used the highest degree of care in handling it
thereafter.
The principle of 'balancing conveniences', must be applied by
the courts in a situation where two legal rights conflict. This prin-
ciple is never more apparent than in the cases which deal with the
question of whether or not a certain business or occupation is such
as warranted violation of the rights of others as to constitute a
nuisance. The surrounding circumstances are considered and If,
In the opinion of the court in the particular case, the economic de-
mand of the community justifies the continued existence of the
business, even In the face of certain loss to the Individual or group,
the right of the latter must yield. The phrase "damnum absque
injuria" finds frequent application in the courts today.
In many of the cases relied upon by the defendant, where a
nuisance was held not to have existed, this principle of 'balancing
conveniences' can be traced, and in nearly every case dealing with
the question, some allusion to It appears.
In the present, case the verdict leaves no room for doubt that
the circumstances surrounding the act of the defendant made his
right to the keeping of dynamite iR the place and manner stated,
inconsistent with the extreme risk of injury consequent thereto.
When we take Into consideration the lighly explosive nature of
dynamite, and the fact that It was kept in one of the rooms of an
office building in close proximity to a stove, we feel that the ver-
dict of the jury correctly supports the contention that a nuisance
has been created.
As was stated in Forster v. Rogers Brothers, supra: "No par-
ticular causal act of negligence contributing to the explosion need
then be shown" so the verdict for the plaintiff can be supported
without evidence that any negligence of the defendant actually
cAused the explosion, there being no evidence to the contrary. A
254
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presumption like this may be said to be a necessity in this class of
cases because of the extreme improbability of receiving the testi-
mony of a witness who saw the dynamite explode.
The second contention of the plaintiff can also be supported.
Sowers v. McManus, 214 Pa. 244, states: "While the possession of
dynamite to be used for a lawful purpose Is neither unlawful nor
negligent, the person in possession of It is, as to third parties,
bound to the highest degree of care, and a failure to take any reas-
onable precaution to prevent explosion of it while in storage is neg-
ligence." This language was quoted with approval in Derry Coal
Co. v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 448, a case in which the defendant was
held liable for an explosion where the only evidence was that dyna-
mite was kept in a small room containing a stove. Mr. Justice
Fell, In the above case says: "The presence of a red-hot stove in
a small building and within a few inches of the dynamite, and of
explosive caps on the floor was, under the testimony, an unsafe
condition, from which an explosion might result .... No explanation
of the cause of the explosion was furnished by the defendant and it
was left to the jury to accept the theory of the plaintiff, based on
affirmative evidence of negligent acts, or that of the defendant of
an unaccountable accident." A statement more appropriate to
the facts of the present case would be difficult to find.
The third question relates to the measure of damages. The
explosion destroyed the building and the injury was certainly of a
permanent nature. We regard the rule as well settled in this
State that when the injury Is of a permanent nature, the measure
of damages Is the actual deterioration of the property in value, or
the difference between the value of the premises before and after
the explosion. Miller v. Hanover Water Co., 240 Pa. 393; Porster
v. Rogers Brothers, 247 Pa. 54; Sebree v. Huntingdon Water Co.,
267 Pa. 420.
While It Is true that the test used in determining the measure
of damages was quite correct, yet the means by which the market
value was ascertained cannot be so regarded. The witness who
testified as to the market value, basing his opinion solely upon ren-
tals for the past three years, was clearly Incompetent, and If ob-
jection to his testimony was properly made, it should have been
stricken out.
The rule In this State is too well settled to admit of question
that tha only basis upon which a witness may state an opinion as
to the value of real estate Is a personal knowledge of the property
and of property in the vicinity, and a knowledge of the general
selling price of lands in the neighborhood. Such knowledge must
be based, not upon evidence of particular sales of similar property.
but upon a knowledge of the price at which lands are generally
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held for sale and sometimes sold, in the neighborhood. To this ef-
fect are: Pittsburg Railways Co. v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325; MIchael v.
Crescent Pipe Line Co., 159 Pa. 99; Friday v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
204 Pa. 405.
There remains but one point to be disposed of, and which may
be said to determine the question of whether or not a new trial is
to be granted. This has to do with the time for making objection
to the testimony of an incompetent witness. The rule enunciated
by Chief Justice Von Moschzisker in Forster v. Rogers Brothers,
supra, Is as follows: "When irrelevant or incompetent testimony
is elicited by questions which are not objected to at the time they
are put, and the trial is permitted. to proceed with this testimony
upon the record, a refusal of a request to strike it out, made after
the witness has left the stand, will not be reviewed; in such a case
the only course Is to ask that the jury be instructed to disregard
the testimony, and a refusal of this request will be assigned for
error."
The motion to strike out need not be made Immediately upon
receipt of the answer of the witness, but will be sufficient if made
after the cross-examination has revealed the Inherent defect In
the testimony on direct examination. This seems the only fair In-
terpretation, as one of the chief objects in the cross-examination of
an opinion witness is to show that his opinions are incorrectly
founded.
It does not appear that the motion to strike ou the incompe-
tent testimony was made after the witness had left the stand, and
we cannot Infer that such was the true situation. In all Justice
and fairness to the counsel for the defendant, we cannot presume
that he slept upon his rights and permitted the witness to leave
the stand without a motion to strike out his testimony after its
glaring incompetency had been exposed by his own. questioning.
W.e must therefore hold that the motion was properly made,
and as the testimony has been shown to have been clearly incom-
petent, the refusal to grant the motion to strike out was error. On
this ground, and on this ground alone, the motion of the defend-
ant's counsel for a new trial of this cause Is granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the court below is so well written and so well
supported by authorities, that scarcely anything can profitably be
added to it.
The negligence, if any, consisted in storing the dynamite in the
room under its existing conditions which made explosions not suffi-
ciently improbable. A more specific negligence It would be unnec-
essary to discover.
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.The value of the building before and its value after the explo-
sion, furnish the difference of value for which, if at all, the defend-
ant is liable. The rentals for three years could no more be ac-
cepted as a criterion of value than the price at which the property
had been sold if it had been sold, could be.
The learned court below follows Forster v. Rogers Brothers,
247 Pa. 54, in making an impalpable distinction between striking
out evidence and directing a jury to disregard it. The distinction
has been often made, but never elucidated. In jury trials, there is
nothing of evidence to "strike out." There was no record at com-
mon law of the evidence, except in the minds, the memories of the
jurors, and yet it became the fashion to speak of "striking out"
evidence, and Instructing that it be disregarded. The distinction is
futile, and it would not be regrettable, if it passed into a long ob-
livion. What is wanted, when evidence has been improperly heard
by the jury, is, that they should expunge It from memory. It
matters little, whether the act by which they are induced to do
this, be called a striking out, or an Instruction to disregard.
The able opinion of the learned court below makes discussion
by us unnecessary.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
MI]LLS v. R. R. CO.
Negligence-Trespassers on Trains-Ejection of Trespassers From
Moving Trains-Liability of Master-Scope of Employ-
ment--Case for Jury
STATEMENT OF FACTS
&Iills, a lad of 14, got on the top of a freight car, intending to
steal a ride to a point five miles off. When the train was in mo-
tion, a brakeman coming along the top of the cars observed him
and menancingly commanded him to get off. The boy attempted to
get off but lost his hold on the ladder, fell and was seriously hurt.
While brakemen were requirea by the R. R. Co. to drive off tres-
passers, they were forbidden to do so while the trains were in mo-
tion. A verdict of $3000 was nevertheless recovered. Appeal.
Grist, for the Plaintiff.
Feinstein, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HARKINS, J. Mills, the plaintiff, a lad of fourteen, got on
the top of a freight car, intending to steal a ride to a point five
miles off. When the train was in motion, a brakeman coming
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along the top of the cars observed him and menacingly command-
ed him to get off. The boy attempted to get off but lost his hold
on the ladder, fell and was seriously hurt. This state of facts
give rise to the first question presented for our determination. It
concerns the duty of care owed by a railroad company to tres-
passers.
Mills at the time of the accident was a trespasser on the defen-
dant company's railroad. While it is true that a railroad company
has a right to eject a trespasser from a train, it nevertheless owes
a duty to the trespasser to exercise that right with ordinary care
and prudence. Those in charge, having discovered the presence of
a trespasser on the train are under a duty to refrain from affirma-
tive acts of negligence. If they eject a trespasser from a train
which is moving so rapidly as to endanger his personal safety, they
have violated that duty and are therefore guilty of negligence for
the results of which the railroad company is liable if injury Is caus-
ed thereby. Enright v. Pittsburg Junct. R. 1R. Co., 198 Pa. 166.
When, as in this case, a train is in motion and an employee of
the railroad company actually becomes aware of the presence of an
infant trespasser thereon, any overt act done by the employee which
Is likely to cause injury to the trespasser, is a negligent act. Pet-
rowski v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 263 Pa. 531.
It has been held in Thomas v. Traction Co., 270 Pa. 146, that
although a boy is a trespasser he cannot lawfully be forced from
a moving vehicle, by fright or otherwise. Here, then, we have a
negligent act of the brakeman resulting In Injury to the plaintiff
for which injury the defendant company is liable.
But, there is a further fact which it is contended, excuses the
defendant company from liability. While brakemen were required
by the railroad company to drive off trespassers, they were forbid-
den to do so while the trains were in motion. This involves the
question of the liability of the master where the servant is In the
course of his employment, but, in the matter complained of, has
acted contrary to the express command of his master.
The general rule of the master's liability is this. A master is
liable for the tortious acts of his servant done in the course of his
employment and within the general scope of his authority. Breen-
an v. Merchane & Co., 205 Pa. 258; Dunne v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
249 Pa. 76; Phila., Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Brannen,
1 Sadler 369.
It will be noted that the test of the master's liability is the de-
termination of the fact as to whether or not the act was done in
the course of the servant's employment. These acts may be divid-
ed into three classes.
The first class comprises those acts which are performed by
DICKINSON L.Aw RIvIEW
the servant at the express command or request of the employer. If
the wrongful act was authorized by the express command or re-
quest of the employer the employer is without question liable for
the natural consequences of that act regardless of the degree of
care exercised by the servant in performing the act. McClung v.
Dearborne, 134 Pa. 396. The master will be liable also if he does
not command the performance of the act but later ratifies it.
As to those of the second class, it is possible that the employer
authorized the performance of a lawful act but in doing the act the
servant performed in a negligent manner, and as a result of his
negligence injury or damage results. The employer Is liable in a
civil action for that injury or damage. Brunner v. Telegraph Co.,
160 Pa. 300; Shaw v. Reed, 9 Watts & S. 72; Penna. Telephone
Co. v. Varnan, 15 Atl. 626.
The third class consists of those acts of a servant which are
the results of an excessive or erroneous execution of a lawful au-
thority in a negligent or wanton manner. The act of the brake-
man in this case belongs in this class. To impute liability to the
employer for the acts of this nature it is necessary to show that
the act of the servant was of a kind which he was in fact authorized
to perform and which if properly done, would be consistent with
the performance of his duty.
The wrongful act complained of was the ejecting from the
train, by the brakeman, of the plaintiff, a trespasser. It was the
duty of the brakeman to drive off trespassers from the train on
which he was employed and this being his duty, even though he had
been ordered to perform this duty in a certain way, namely, while
the train was not In motion, when he departed from the orders
of his employer, he was, nevertheless, engaged in driving off a
trespasser and was acting in the line of his employment. The fact
that he was exceeding his authority was a disregarding of particu-
lar instructions but it was not such an interruption of the course
of his employment as to determine or suspend the liability of his
employer. So long as the servant acts within the scope of his em-
ployment, his employer is liable for the tortious acts of the servant
even though the particular act be done in excpss of his authority
or even contrary to the express instruction of the employer. Dunne
v. Penna. & R. R. Co., supra; Peterosky v. Phila. & R. R. Co.,
supra; Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 467."
As has been said, the criterion by which we determine the lia-
bility of the employer for the tortious acts of his servant is this.
Was the servant at the time the particular act complained of was
done, acting within the course of the employment? An affirmative
answer to this. question fastens liability upon the employer while
If the question is answered in the negative, the employer is not
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liable. We shall now look to the application of the rule.
In determining whether an employee was acting within the
course of his employment when a specific act was done, the duties
involved in the general scope of such employmene are the criteria
and any privately imparted orders limiting those duties have no
bearing. Third persons can see and know the general scope of the
servant's employment, but since they have no means of knowing
the secret orders given the servant, they are not affected by them.
Peterosky v. Phila. & R. R. Co., supra; Phila., Wilmington &
Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Brannen, 1 Sadler 369.
When the act In question, if properly done, would have been
consistent with the performance of the servant's duty, it Is presum-
ed, unless there be evidence to the contrary, that the act was per-
formed in the course of his employment. Bickley v. P. & R. Co.,
257 Pa. 369.
If, in a given case the facts and inferences to be drawn from
the tortious act are not In dispute, the court may as a matter of
law, determine that the act was done in the course of the servant's
employment. Brennan v. Merchant & Co., supra.
On the other hand, if there is evidence to the contrary or if the
facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are in dispute,
whether or not the act of the servant was done in the performance
of his employment is a question of fact for the jury. Guinney v.
Hand, 153 Pa. 404; Stidfole v. Phila. & R. R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 445.
These cases must be distinguished from those in which it is
said that a master is not liable for the wilful or malicious acts of
his employee. The word wilful in this connection is not used in
the common meaning of the term. It means more than a mere
voluntary or intentional act. It is used in the sense of being in-
duced by a personal motive for the gratification of the actor's own
will. In order to classify a specific act as wilful or malicious in
this sense, the act must be not only a deviation from the line of
the servant's duties but also a total departure from the course of
the master's business. When the court says that a master is not
liable for the wilful and malicious acts of the servant, it is by no
means contravening the rule that a master is liable for the negli-
gent or wanton acts of the servant done within the course of his
employment because when an act is wilful or malicious as used in
this sense, that specific act was not performed in the course of the
servant's employment. Berryman v. P. R. R., 228 Pa. 621;
Brennan v. Merchant & Co., supra.
A good guide to use in determining whether the particular act
was within the scope of the servant's employment or whether the
particual act was wilful or malicious is to answer the following
questions. Did the employer put the agent in his place to do. that
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class of acts? Pollock on Torts, p. 52. Having ascertained that
the employer Is liable for the natural consequences of that act, re-
gardless of any deviation of the servant from the prescribed man-
ner of performance. If however the act Is one of a kind, for the
doing of which the employer did not put the servant in his place,
the act is wilful and malicious and the employer is not liable.
In the present case the jury has determined this question.
The jury found that the act of the brakeman was a negligent act
and that the act was done in the performance of his employment.
Applying the above rules to the facts of this case, the court is of
the opinion that the defendant company is responsible to answer
in damages for the injuries which were the natural and proximate
- consequences of the wrongful act of Its employee in frightening the
boy so that he fell from the train.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Mills, the plaintiff, was stealing a ride. He had no right to
do this. It was proper for the brakeman, to see that he did not
accomplish his purpose, if thaf could be done without undue vio-
lence to the body of the plaintiff, and without causing serious dam-
age to him.
A menacing command to a boy of 14 years, might be enough to
Induce him to leave the top of the car. But, to leave the car,
while In motion, was to do an act involving serious peril to the
boy, and it was not difficult for a jury to find,injury resulting to
him, that the causing of him, by threat or otherwise, to leave the
car, the train being in motion, was a very improvident and reck-
less act.
The real question is, as to the liability of the Railroad Com-
pany, for this act of the brakeman. It was his duty, when pos-
sible without serious danger, to require a trespasser to leave the
train, but it was his duty not to require this, unless the train
could be stopped, or submission to the requirement could be other-
wise made practicable without risk.
The principal thing attempted by the brakeman was in the
line of his duty. It was modally done in a prohibited way. But,
although the mode is of supreme importance, and the company
would be better Cerved by allowing a trespasser to continue on the
car, than by adopting the forbidden or discountenanced method, the
cases are too numerous, in which the employer has been held liable
for injuries received by the employe's adoption of this method, to
warrant any result other than that reached by the learned court
below, which his able opinion has so well fortified. The brakeman
was intent on the doing of a duty to his employer. The mode
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adopted by him was, under the circumstances, unwise, and because
of its unwisdom was not encouraged, was in fact discouraged, by
the R. R. Co. It must take the risk of unwise, hasty, modally in-
defensible methods adopted in the effort honestly to serve the com-
pany. Dunne v. Penna. R. R. Co., 249 Pa. 76, and several cases
cited by the learned court below, lend support to the decision. The
judgment of the court below is therefore
APPIRMED.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Law of Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts.
By Sydney R. Wrightington, Second Edition, Little, Brown, &
Co., Boston, 1923.
Seven years ago the first edition of this excellent work appear-
ed. Between excessive taxes, blue sky la ws and all kinds of gov-
ernmental regulation, the resort to the corporation as the natural
means of cooperative business has been made with more and more
hesitation in recent years. A return to the unincorporated asso-
ciation or a resort to the "Massachusetts Business Trust" as a
substitute is the alternative. The latter has been the subject of
much discussion of late but the line between the attempted trust
which may be construed to impose the liability of partnership upon
those interested and the safe trust which eliminates personal liabil-
ity has not been so clearly drawn as to make the business trust a
popular expedient. The writer of this volume assures us that the
line has now been so drawn that one may proceed to organize a bus-
iness trust and know with assurance what provisions may be in-
serted with safety to the contributors of the capital. But it is con-
ceded that the law is not yet made on many important questions
raised by the terms of the elaborate trust deeds used to create these
organizations. This book is as nearly a complete guide to lawyers
given the task of drawing these instruments as can be furnished
in the present state of the law. An appendix of nearly two hun-
dred pages is devoted to forms with a full analysis of the various
provisions inserted by many of the most conspicuous business trusts
In their agreements and declarations of trust. The new edition is
commended as an excellent working tool for practitioners in a
new and impartial field.
